Blackwater and Iraqi Forces in an Armed Standoff

Steve Fainaru and Saad al-Izzi report in the Washington Post that Blackwater USA was involved in two shooting incidents in Baghdad last week and one of the incidents sparked an armed standoff between Iraqi Interior Ministry Forces and Blackwater:

The [3 US and one Iraqi] officials described a tense standoff that ensued between the Blackwater guards and Interior Ministry forces -- both sides armed with assault rifles -- until a passing U.S. military convoy intervened.

The tensions flared after Blackwater team members fired upon an Iraqi vehicle:

Details about that incident remained sketchy. The Blackwater guards said the victim drove too close to their convoy and drew fire, according to the three American officials. Concerned about a possible car bomb or other threat, the guards said they tried to wave off the vehicle, shouted, fired a warning shot into the radiator, then shot into the windshield when the driver failed to pull back, the officials said. Such steps are recommended under the rules for the use of force by contractors in Iraq specified in Memorandum 17, a set of guidelines adopted in 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S.-led occupation government, and still in effect.

The Iraqi official said the driver encountered the Blackwater convoy after leaving a gas station just outside the Interior Ministry. Some witnesses said the shooting was unprovoked, the official said. He said the driver had wounds in his shoulder, chest and head.

The behavior is consistent with known BW tactics which have been criticized for their aggression although the firm has been praised for never losing a principal whom they were guarding. 

A day earlier, Fainaru and al-Izzi report, a Blackwater convoy protecting State Department officials was ambushed in Baghdad.  Reinforements from the big military were called in, including Apaches and ground forces.  The battle reportedly lasted an hour.

The ambush underscores why private military teams use such aggressive tactics and just how blurred the lines between defensive security and combat have become in this outsourced war.   Read the article.  It's well worth it.

Comments

[BillW.]

It really is a tough spot to be in for Blackwater. They have to maintain the security of their contracts, at the same time try not to stray outside of political guidelines that are constantly changing.

One question. How come we rarely if ever hear of this kind of "over aggressive" action from any of the multitude of PSC's out there other than BW?
Those guys over at BW seem to be real good at finding the cow pie in the field and stepping in it.

[R J Hillhouse]

BW, TC--they're all in tough spots and I don't envy what their management has to deal with--though I do envy the bottom lines.

There are plenty of PMCs out there doing what could easily be termed "overly aggressive" actions or to put it in their terms, the "defensive posture" concept is often violated. These other outfits are just not on the radar and much occurs in under reported areas such as Anbar province.

Given that the new role of PMCs has been a revolution in how American fights her wars, the topic has received very little attention from the media. Only in the past year have things started to pick up, but even then it’s usually someone doing a single story, then moving on. The longstanding exceptions to this have been Bill Sizemore at the Virginia Pilot and Jay Price at the News Observer who have both covered their neighbor, Blackwater. The WSJ is following BW’s legal troubles, but the reporting has been pretty mediocre.

Coverage shifted for the with the Washington Post’s assignment of Steve Fainaru to the PMC beat. Fainaru has done some distinguished reporting from Iraq and did a very impressive piece on Triple Canopy’s problem child who decided to go joy shooting his last day in Iraq.

Blackwater has become high profile and has had some of the highest profile contacts in the industry. Aside from this, in the case in point, the standoff with Iraqi forces was in front of the Ministry of Interior, but even then, the story slipped past the NYT, the wire services, etc.

[Tony Foresta]

Not only the NYT, the wire services, etc., - but evidently Congress as well. Certainly there are some comittee's or individual congresspersons aware of the PMC and PIC issues, (nebulous command structure, unknown unknown rules of engagement, accoutability or lack thereof, ultimate objectives, actual contract details in terms of how much, what for, the bidding process, etc.) - and yet they are all alarmingly silent.

Who, or what exactly oversee's the PMC's, and why are they silent?

[AndyC]

As a former "trunk monkey" - not associated with BW - I can empathise with their actions, because I assure you that other PSD teams definitely do the same.

"How come we rarely if ever hear of this kind of "over aggressive" action from any of the multitude of PSC's out there other than BW?"

I would submit that not many people would recognise the names of other PSCs if they were even mentioned. Brand-name recognition is a double-edged sword - BW has to take the bad with the good.

On another point - and perhaps more importantly - who defines which actions are overly-aggressive? I would suggest that those of us who have been there have the experience to judge - those who haven't been in that position simply haven't the first idea.

To give you an example - I was watching with a friend of mine a few clips of a rear-gunner in action. It was interesting that we were almost completely at odds in our respective judgements of each incident - but I was able to say why I agreed or disagreed with the gunner's actions, based on what I saw through the lens of my experience.

Any Iraqi, whether civilian or police, knows to stay well away from any overt contractor convoy - this is just a fact-of-life over there. If a vehicle appeared as if it was about to get within 100 yards, we used hand-signals to wave them back, loud yells, etc.

If they ignored that and came closer, we would point the MG at them - and if they still didn't back off, we followed the 3G's - Ground, Grille & Glass. This starts with a short burst into the Ground ahead of them to warn them off - if someone was aggressive enough to continue to approach, it was then time for a short burst into the Grille. If they continued to press the issue, it was followed by shooting into the Glass.

It takes a lot of aggression on the part of a driver approaching a convoy to get himself shot; we'd be happy to leave everyone alone if they leave us alone. Starting a punchup is a choice made by them, not us.